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Jasmine Does Not Bloom in Pyongyang: The
Persistent Non-transition in North Korea*
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At the beginning of 2011, the world was shaken by an “earthquake” which
struck the Middle East and African regions. Following the Arab Spring or
Jasmine Revolution, many pundits stated that North Korea could be the next
to be affected by this wind of change, and the North Korean dictatorial
leadership could collapse soon. This assumption acquired further validity
soon after Kim Jong-il’s death. This paper draws on the democratic transi-
tion and consolidation literature that has grown considerably in the last
decades. According to this literature, a few factors facilitate and promote
democratization – most prominently, an elite split between hardliners and
softliners; the emergence of civil society and its pro-democracy movement;
and a certain degree of international pressure. Through an analysis of these
factors, this paper shows why North Korea is “resistant to change” and will
not follow in the Middle East’s footsteps. We argue that the main reason for
the non-transition in North Korea is the absence of the conditions that have
been identified in the democratization literature as critical factors promoting
democratic transition.
Key words: North Korea, non-transition, Jasmine Revolution, elite split,
civil society.
Introduction
At the beginning of 2011, the world was shaken by an “earthquake” which
struck the Middle East region, enlarging its seismic movement to Tunisia, Egypt,
Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and other countries. The riot
sparked off in the heart of Tunisia, where a young peddler, Mohamed Bouazizi,
doused himself with flammable liquid and set himself on fire, dying a few days
* The present paper is the outcome of a joint effort by the two authors. In practice, though, Fiori
wrote the first, second, third and sixth sections while Kim wrote the fourth and fifth sections. Authors’
names appear in alphabetical order. Kim is the corresponding author.
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later. The case of Bouazizi was not the first of its kind, and, as always, it would
have received limited coverage in the news, but the episode ignited a series of
incidents and protests in the whole country. During the youngster’s funeral, in
particular, many young people invaded the streets: the common denominator was
that these people were young, cultured and educated, and above all unemployed
and forced to accept low-skilled and low-paid jobs. Beyond better employment
conditions, demonstrators asked for improved living conditions, a renovated politi-
cal environment and a fairer wealth distribution in the country. The protests
resulted in the escape of longtime President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to Saudi
Arabia on 14 January 2011, putting an end to his 23 years in power.
Tunisian uprisings, immediately dubbed the “Jasmine Revolution,”1 ignited a
series of protests that, with a domino effect, involved the entire region. Revolts
against the governments erupted, some of them becoming severely violent, some
facing strong suppression, and some resulting in various political changes. The
major causes of this “revolution” in the Middle East region are common and share
the same roots: protesters were in fact motivated by a similar set of socioeconomic
grievances – high inflation, rising unemployment and falling real wages – and
political objectives, the first of which was restoring basic freedoms that decades of
authoritarianism had frustrated.
Soon after the echo of the Middle East riots became perceptible, some pundits
started discussing the possible spread of the “revolution” to some countries of the
Asian continent, like China and North Korea. In China some protests occurred,
partly due to the vigorous spread of social media like Facebook and Twitter, but
were immediately controlled and silenced by the government.2 North Korea, on the
other hand, has remained largely impermeable to all these developments, consti-
tuting a notable exception. Towards the end of February 2011, in fact, it was
reported in a few newspapers and by some online resources that multiple protests
had erupted in the North Pyongan Province, in the cities of Sinuiju, Yongchon,
Sonchon and Jongju, over difficult economic conditions.3 The main reasons for
these protests in North Korea, however, seem more attributable to the demand of
1. The term “Jasmine Revolution” has been widely used by Western media after Tunisia’s national
flower and in keeping with the geopolitical nomenclature of “color revolutions.” Many Tunisians,
however, prefer to use “Dignity Revolution” to describe the 2011 events, because “Jasmine Revolu-
tion” was the term Ben Ali introduced in 1987 to describe his own takeover.
2. Antonio Fiori, “And If the ‘Arab Spring’ Were to Become Chinese?” Europressresearch (5 July
2011), at <http://www.europressresearch.eu/html/focus.php?lang=ENG&id=79&s=fiori> (searched
date: 15 December 2011).
3. “North Korean Protesters Demand Food and Electricity,” The Chosun Ilbo (23 February
2011), at <http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/02/23/2011022300383.html> (searched
date: 20 June 2011); “No Signs of Organized Resistance in North Korea: Official,”
Yonhap News (24 February 2011), at <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/02/24/18/
0401000000AEN20110224008600315F.HTML> (searched date: 22 June 2011); Mark McDonald,
“Hardships Fail to Loosen Regime’s Grip in N. Korea,” The New York Times (24 February 2011), at
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25iht-north.html?_r=0> (searched date: 22 June
2011).
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food than to concerted mobilization, which did not occur. The populace in certain
zones of the country was, and probably still is, starving because of the failed
currency reform attempted by the regime in November 2009, and as a consequence
of the international sanctions imposed after the most recent provocations of the
North Korean regime. Despite the enthusiastic tones of some Western journalists,
the Middle Eastern wind of change has not blown in Pyongyang; on the contrary,
this “impermeability” to change has been reinforced by the transfer of power into
the hands of the young new leader Kim Jong-un. There are good reasons to think
that North Korea is not going to undergo a historic transition at any time soon.
The main purpose of this paper is to explain the persistent non-transition in
North Korea. Why is North Korea so impervious to dramatic changes that hap-
pened in other parts of the world? Why do those factors that precipitated changes
in other countries not emerge and develop in North Korea? In particular, we
analyze the North Korean case in the light of the literature on democratic transition
and consolidation. We argue that the main reason why the North Korean regime is
different from those regimes torn down by protestors in the Middle East and will
not be subject to the same destiny is the absence of the conditions that have been
identified in the democratization literature as critical factors promoting democratic
transition. The paper specifically proceeds as follows. In the next section, we
summarize the “collapse of North Korea” debate over the past few decades and
discuss how the existing literature on democratization can inform and illuminate
the debate. In the following three sections we examine in detail the factors that are
considered crucial in a transition to democracy, that is, international pressure, elite
split and civil society. Based on our examination of all the factors that are pre-
sumed to promote and facilitate democratic transition, we conclude in the final
section that persistent non-transition will continue to characterize North Korea in
the future.
The “Collapsist Debate” and the Literature on Democratization
North Korea’s allegedly imminent collapse has been theorized – and sometimes
even invoked – since the disintegration of the Communist bloc. The “collapse of
North Korea” theory was especially popular during the Kim Young-sam govern-
ment (1993–1998)4 and functioned as a fundamental (albeit implicit) policy
consensus during the Lee Myung-bak government (2008–2013). It argues that
economic stresses – most prominently expressed in the widespread famine and
acute food emergency – and other systemic weaknesses would make the North
Korean regime break down. The “collapse” theory was reinforced by the ratifica-
4. See for example: Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press,
1999); Sung Chull Kim, Young Tai Jeung, Seung-Yul Oh, Hun Kyung Lee, and Gee Dong Lee, North
Korea in Crisis: An Assessment of Regime Sustainability (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Uni-
fication, 1997).
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tion of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework: Pyongyang’s decision to bargain
away its nuclear weapons program for oil and resources – unexpected by many in
Washington – was considered to be another piece of evidence of the difficulties the
regime was experiencing. To those who criticized the decision to provide Pyong-
yang with civilian nuclear power reactors in return for the freeze, one official
replied that the construction of the reactors would take a long time “and that is
almost certainly a sufficient period of time for their regime to have collapsed. The
country simply won’t exist then because it will have been absorbed by South
Korea.”5 This kind of declaration became the norm during that period.
North Korea’s systemic weaknesses were to become more and more palpable
after the death of the “Great Leader” Kim Il-sung. North Korea, according to South
Korean President Kim Young-sam’s evaluation, was nothing more than “a broken
airplane” headed for a crash-landing that would be followed by a quick reunifica-
tion of the peninsula. This impression was again shared by the Americans: in 1996
the then-Commander of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), General Gary
Luck, declared during his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee
that “the question is not will this country [North Korea] disintegrate, but rather how
it will disintegrate, by implosion or explosion, and when.”6 Soon after, a US
government and outside team of experts envisaged a regime collapse in North
Korea within 5 years.7
These prognostications, like many others of their kind, have constantly proven
false. The North Korean regime not only survived the death of its “Great Leader,”
but during the following era, under the guidance of Kim Jong-il, it endured a
dramatic famine during which no large civil protests were launched or detected: at
that time “North Korea’s starving farmers did not rebel. They just died.”8
More recently, in the wake of the Arab Spring protests in the Middle East, the
“collapse” discussion has been revived. One of the first scholars who studied the
likelihood of a revolution analogous to the Arab Spring occurring in North Korea
was Andrei Lankov, who, even before the death of the “Dear Leader” Kim Jong-il,
took into consideration two main factors conducive to the outburst of a revolution.9
The first reflection is that revolutions do not take place when people are really
desperate and are usually not conceived by those belonging to the lowest class of
society: as it happened in Eastern Europe and Russia, the “intellectual circles” are
frequently responsible for the ignition and guidance of uprisings that lead to social
5. Jeffrey R. Smith, “U.S. Accord with North Korea May Open Country to Change,” Washington
Post (23 October 1994), p. A36.
6. Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 3.
7. Bruce Cumings, North Korea: Another Country (New York: New Press, 2004), p. 199.
8. Andrei Lankov, “Staying Alive: Why North Korea Will Not Change,” Foreign Affairs, 87-2
(March/April 2008), pp. 9–16.
9. Andrei Lankov, “Conditions Unripe for North Korea Revolt,” Asia Times (17 November 2011), at
<http://atimes.com/atimes/Korea/MK17Dg01.html> (searched date: 12 April 2013).
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modification. However, it is absolutely evident that these kinds of circles are
neither present nor allowed in North Korea, because their existence could be highly
detrimental to the regime. The second reflection is that, as Lankov argues, “people
start revolutions when they know alternatives to the current system.” This means
that, unlike Tunisia and Egypt, where people had enjoyed far more comfortable
lives before the Arab Spring, North Koreans largely ignore the world around
them, and this lack of information does not allow for the construction – or even
visualization – of possible political alternatives.
In addition, many suppose that the North Korean leadership closely monitored
the development of the situation in the Middle East and, as a consequence, they
obscured any information about the revolution that could spread inside their
country10 and possibly restricted the movements of the personnel in friend coun-
tries like Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, fearing that
rumors on the uprising could create tensions within the population. As a result, the
control over mobile phones, computer and any intrusion of foreign culture through
Chinese and South Korean channels was immediately tightened up.11 The unavail-
ability of these devices, in Fared Zakaria’s opinion, gravely limits the possibility
that the discontent could go through the same channels as in Egypt and Tunisia.12
After Kim Jong-il’s death there has been polarization among scholars concern-
ing North Korea’s future. On the one side, there were those academics who were
convinced that, contrary to what many were predicting and even hoping, the power
transition to young and inexperienced Kim Jong-un would not create instability,
because in North Korea an opposition to the hereditary succession would mean an
opposition to the state itself.13 On the other side, some scholars maintained that
even though the leading causes that had sparked protests across the Arab world
were “conspicuously absent in the case of North Korea,”14 the outcome could
eventually be the same at a certain point, especially because the “combination of
bottom-up societal shifts counteracted by rigid, top-down repression efforts is
creating a tension in the North that could give way someday soon creating a
political earthquake in the country.”15 Cha observed that the Arab Spring pointed to
10. According to The Korea Herald, less than 1% of the North’s population, mainly senior cadres,
have heard anything about the uprisings. It is not clear, however, how this data was measured.
11. David McNeill, “North Koreans Stranded in Libya after Ban on Return,” The Independent (2
November 2011), at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-koreans-stranded-in-
libya-after-ban-on-return-6255857.html> (searched date: 15 April 2013).
12. Fareed Zakaria, “Will the North Koreans Rise Up?” CNN (14 November 2011), at <http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/11/14/zakaria-will-the-north-koreans-rise-up/> (searched
date: 25 April 2013).
13. Brian R. Myers, “Dynasty, North Korean-Style,” New York Times (7 January 2012), at <http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/dynasty-north-korean-style.html?_r=2&> (searched
date: 15 April 2012).
14. Victor D. Cha and Nicholas D. Anderson, “A North Korean Spring?” The Washington Quarterly,
35-1 (Winter 2012), pp. 7–24.
15. Ibid., p. 21.
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a more repressive posture assumed by the regime in the case it felt threatened; in
the end, a system like the North Korean one simply “cannot hold, and we should
all be ready when the moment of truth for this dictatorship arrives.”16
More than 20 years after the “collapse of North Korea” theory first appeared,
there exists no strong evidence that the North Korean regime will collapse
anytime soon. Despite numerous arguments over the past two decades or so for
the feasibility and desirability of regime collapse, the history has so far proved
that those arguments are largely erroneous. The North Korean regime still exists,
and its non-transition is persistent. To analyze the reasons behind the persistent
absence of democratic transition in North Korea, it is crucial to reflect on and
extract relevant lessons from the existing literature on democratization. Rather
than narrowly focusing on North Korea to analyze its regime (in)stability, we in
this paper try to connect North Korea to the larger and richer literature on demo-
cratic transition and consolidation. In other words, we intend to bring North
Korea out of the North Koreanologist framework and place it in a Comparative
Political one.
In the democratization literature, regime collapse and democratic transition are
not the same. Collapse is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for demo-
cratic transition. Authoritarian collapse might lead to the inauguration of another
(or even more) authoritarian regime. On the other hand, democratic transition
does not always occur through the collapse of a regime. According to Terry Karl,
the four modes/types of democratic transition comprise, depending on the rela-
tive strength of actors (i.e., elite ascendant vs mass ascendant) and the strategies
of transition (i.e., compromise vs force): (i) pact (elite, compromise); (ii) reform
(mass, compromise); (iii) imposition (elite, force); and (iv) revolution (mass,
force).17 Similarly, according to Samuel Huntington, the four modes of transition
include: (i) transformation (top-down, elite-controlled change within the govern-
ment); (ii) transplacement (reform negotiated between elites and the opposition);
(iii) replacement (regime breakdown/collapse or “rupture”); and (iv) intervention
(by foreign powers).18 As is clear from these two widely accepted typologies of
democratic transition in the field, transitions that involve collapse are only
revolution/replacement or imposition/intervention, and these types are relatively
rare compared with pact/transformation or reform/transplacement. In this regard,
as far as the North Korean case is concerned, the hitherto emphasis by both
academics and policy-makers on “collapse” is misfocused and biased. We should
16. Victor D. Cha, “North Korea’s Moment of Truth,” CNN (27 December 2011), at <http://
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/27/cha-north-koreas-moment-of.truth/> (searched date:
25 January 2012).
17. Terry Lynn Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” Comparative Politics, 23-1
(October 1990), pp. 1–21.
18. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
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put the North Korean case in a broader theoretical context, also taking into
account gradual transition types that do not necessarily entail collapse.
Over the past few decades, works on democratic transition and consolidation
have proliferated, with a number of major findings on those factors that are
conducive to democratization.19 According to the extensive and still growing
literature on democratization, scholars have generally agreed on three factors
facilitating and promoting democratization:20 (i) various types of international
pressure;21 (ii) an elite split between “hardliners” and “softliners;”22 and (iii) the
emergence of civil society and its pro-democracy movement.23
Of these three factors, we first examine international pressure, because it is
easier to demonstrate its inapplicability to the case of North Korea. Regarding the
other two factors (i.e., elite split and civil society), we will conduct a more detailed
analysis in the following two sections. This line of analysis conforms with the
general literature on democratization (often referred to as “transitology”), because
there exists a much greater number of works on elite and civil society than
international pressure, and historically more transitions have been caused by the
former two factors than the latter one.
19. Valerie Bunce, “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,” Compara-
tive Political Studies, 33-6/7 (2000), pp. 703–734.
20. In addition to the three factors we examine in this paper, there exist other factors such as
socioeconomic, cultural, or historical ones. But these factors are considered to be mostly background/
contextual conditions, not direct causes of democratization. The recent trend in the literature has been
to focus on “contingent” and “strategic” factors, rather than “structural” conditions. For examples of
socioeconomic development as a background condition for opening up “windows of opportunity” for
democratization, see Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960); Larry
Diamond, “Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered,” American Behavioral Scientist,
35-4/5 (March/June 1992), pp. 450–499; and Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio
Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being
in the World, 1950–1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
21. Laurence Whitehead, ed., The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the
Americas, Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Geoffrey Pridham, “The
International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” in
Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle, eds., The Politics of Demo-
cratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1995), pp. 166–203
22. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986);
John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and
Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
23. Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transi-
tions,” Comparative Politics, 29-3 (April 1997), pp. 305–322; Ruth B. Collier and James Mahoney,
“Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labor and Recent Democratization in South
America and Southern Europe,” Comparative Politics, 29-3 (April 1997), pp. 285–303; Sunhyuk
Kim, The Politics of Democratization in Korea: The Role of Civil Society (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 2000).
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International Pressure
In the literature on democratic transition and consolidation, external and inter-
national conditions favorable to democratic change include, for example, defeat in
a war or explicit or implicit pressure by other countries. In the case of North Korea,
none of these factors seem to figure prominently or have worked effectively.
In the last two decades, North Korea’s relations with the international commu-
nity have often been tumultuous and on two occasions, efficaciously named the
first and the second nuclear crisis (respectively, 1994 and 2002), a serious military
confrontation has been – fortunately for the Korean peninsula – avoided.
In recent times, although not always in complete agreement with each other, the
South Korean governments and theirAmerican counterparts have in the main joined
forces in the implementation of what the Obama administration later epitomized as
“strategic patience” on the Korean peninsula: both administrations have untiringly
proclaimed that North Korea has to renounce any kind of nuclear weapons and make
step to return to the concerted solution of the Six-Party Talks. It seems evident – by
looking at the strengthening of alliances with South Korea and Japan – that the
United States is trying to convince the North Koreans to renounce their nuclear
arsenal, while limiting China’s growing power in the region. In addition, although
the military alliances with Seoul and Tokyo remain valid, Washington is pressuring
Beijing to exert some influence on Pyongyang in order to soften the tones.
North Korean regime collapse is not the best option for the United States, and
Washington is not going to support regime change. Such an option was taken into
account with respect to some countries in the Middle East, but an intervention in
North Korea could eventually lead China to intervene. Secondly, it would be too
difficult for the United States to control and manage the outcomes of an eventual
regime change in North Korea, primarily because the reaction of the military
would be hard to predict. In addition, such a situation would conflict with China’s
interests. Therefore, it is highly probable that the best option for the United States
is strengthening the military alliance with its allies in the region while working for
a peaceful negotiation with Pyongyang on its nuclear weapon program. Regime
change through military intervention does not seem to be a viable option for the
United States.
North Korea’s international positioning has always been clearly intertwined
with its traditional “ally,” the People’s Republic of China, and, to a lesser extent
after 1989, with Russia. Both of these countries’ approach is aimed at maintaining
the status quo within the “hermit kingdom.” The People’s Republic of China,
North Korea’s largest supporter and ideological partner, has always supported the
idea of a reunified Korean peninsula, but this event must be achieved peacefully
and through a mutual decision of people on both sides of the border.24 It is,
24. Gill Bates, China’s North Korea Policy: Assessing Interests and Influences (Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute for Peace, 2011).
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however, hardly believable that something comparable to the Arab Spring could
lead to a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. It is clear that the Chinese
vision of North Korea is becoming more and more diversified in different circles
of power: the official line is gradually being affected by numerous alternative
views of what the relationship with Pyongyang should be. However, there are a few
recurring elements that make us believe that China will likely continue to support
the North Korean regime, even though Pyongyang’s nuclear deterrence is giving
Beijing a chronic headache.
The first reason why Beijing is so interested in preserving the status quo in North
Korea is related to the balance of power on the Korean peninsula: to Chinese eyes
the American strategy – exacerbated by the so-called “pivot to Asia” launched at
the end of 2011 by the Obama administration – is aimed at a containment of
China’s influence, and for this reason it is important to maintain a security buffer,
represented by North Korea. This is of real importance especially because the
Americans are strengthening their alliances and military cooperation with several
actors in the Asia–Pacific, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The second
reason is the usual fear that a possible collapse of the North Korean regime could
mean a significant influx of refugees on the Chinese borders. Finally, since the
Chinese have established a solid trade and economic relationship with South
Korea, which is immensely more significant than the economic cooperation with
the North, it is unlikely that Beijing would endanger its economic profits. There-
fore, even though it is manifest that inside the Chinese government there might be
different opinions about the nature of the relationship that Beijing should build and
develop with Pyongyang, maintaining the status quo is the most straightforward
and convenient way not to jeopardize regional stability. In the remote eventuality
of a popular uprising in North Korea, the Chinese would do what they could to
preserve the status quo and to help the Kim regime stabilize the situation. Pundits
have casually underlined the extent to which China can influence North Korea’s
domestic policies and foreign policy behaviors. However, as far as the issue of
North Korea’s regime change toward democratization is concerned, the influence
of China has been and will continue to be marginal, focusing on the preservation
of the authoritarian status quo.
In addition, it must be highlighted that the pressure par excellence exerted by the
international community towards Pyongyang, in the form of sanctions, seems to
have found scarce success. The history of sanctions against North Korea is long
and varied: from the UNSCR 0825 voted in 1993 to UNSCR 2094 passed in March
2013, North Korea has been sanctioned in various forms and for different reasons.
The efficacy of these sanctions, particularly for igniting any kind of transition in
North Korea, is disputed. First, economic restraints are very well known in the
“hermit kingdom” and are not dreaded. Enduring hardships, even starvation, is
seen in North Korea as being much more preferable than capitulating to outside
pressure. It goes without saying that the effects of economic sanctions are felt
almost exclusively by common people, not by the regime, while the commitment
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to the nuclear program remains substantially untouched, since it is the key to the
survival of the regime itself. Second, the major actors involved have not been
sufficiently cooperative or coordinated in implementing and sustaining sanctions
against Pyongyang. Despite having supported the official international comm-
unity’s stance, China and Russia have traditionally tried to soften the tones against
North Korea and have constantly remained reluctant to push too hard. Once again,
the reason behind this attitude is probably that Beijing does not want a collapse of
the North Korean regime to provoke a flood of refugees and the possibility of the
creation of a unified, pro-American Korea on its borders. At the same time, many
have called for a tougher attitude of the United States in the implementation of
sanctions toward Pyongyang, blaming Washington for its open-endedness dictated
by the fear that the regime could respond firmly, throwing the region into disorder.
Lastly, even though North Korea has been subjected to rounds of sanctions for
years, it is still in the position to perform effectively in military terms, as demon-
strated by the rocket launch to put a satellite into orbit (December 2012) and the
third nuclear test (February 2013). These successes confirm that sanctions have not
produced a useful hamper to the fulfillment of North Korea’s major military
achievements.
Of the three main factors facilitating and causing democratic transition, if we
exclude international pressure, which currently does not work for North Korea, the
discussion ultimately boils down to the two remaining factors that could poten-
tially contribute to a transition: elite split and civil society, which are also the most
widely discussed factors in transitology. In the following two sections, we examine
these factors in greater detail.
Elite Split
To understand the absence of elite split in North Korea, it is imperative to explore
first the development of the North Korean political system during 45 years under
Kim Il-song (1949–1994). When Kim Il-song emerged as one of the most promising
leaders in North Korea during 1945–1946, he was competing with several other
leaders who had led communist and nationalist movements in and outside of the
country. Despite strong support from the Soviet Union, it was initially challenging
for the “Great Leader” to monopolize power.After the Korean War (1950–1953) and
throughout the 1950s, however, Kim Il-song gradually solidified his power, carrying
out a series of political purges to remove hostile factions and opponent leaders from
the political arena.As a consequence, the ruling bloc that emerged by the mid-1960s
was a highly unified group of old revolutionaries and comrades who were extremely
loyal to Kim Il-song. Moreover, into the 1970s and the 1980s, Kim Il-song
systematically established and consolidated his personal rule, developing Juche
(self-reliance) ideology centered around his status and role of Suryong (“Supreme
Leader”). No challenges to Suryong and his Juche ideology – either from within the
ruling bloc or from the popular sector – were tolerated.
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In particular, the Suryong system, strongly influenced by the Confucian tradi-
tion, has served to legitimize the Kim family regime: Kim Il Sung is the father of
the Korean nation, and Kim Jong-il the dutiful son who carries on his father’s
legacy. The same applies to Kim Jong-un. In order to support this system, the
regime has created a sophisticated cult of personality that, for example, makes it
mandatory for each North Korean citizen to wear a lapel pin with the effigy of Kim
Il Sung and Kim Jong-il, to make a pilgrimage to the founder of the nation’s
birthplace in the Mangyongdae section of Pyongyang, and to have the two Kims’
portraits in every household or public office. Both leaders’ lives are punctuated
with mythological events. The entire society is tightly regimented, controlled, and
monitored.25
That the leadership under Kim Il-song was exceptionally united and did not
allow any internal split or dissent is strongly confirmed by many prominent North
Korea experts who have characterized North Korea as a “totalitarian regime.”26
Kim Il-song’s rule went well beyond an authoritarian27 or a sultanistic regime.28
Some observers have even characterized the North Korean polity as a “theocracy”
in which Kim Il-song was revered as a (demi)god and many of his relatives,
including his great grandfather, grandfather, and parents were all depicted as
national heroes engaged in a fierce anti-American and anti-Japanese national
independence movement. Everything related to Kim Il-song, such as his birth-
place, was sacred, and so many aspects of North Korean politics became
“religionalized.”29
Such exceptional elite unity and cohesiveness, although slightly changed in
nature and intensity, continued into the Kim Jong-il era. The transition from Kim
Il-song to Kim Jong-il was not an abrupt decision of crisis management. From the
early 1970s, the potential “succession” problem was handled with great care by the
North Korean leadership. Therefore, Kim Jong-il’s “formal” inauguration in 1997
was by no means a product of internal power struggles following his father’s death.
Rather, it represented the finale of a well-orchestrated leadership succession. This
is why Hwang Jang-yop, the main architect of North Korea’s Juche ideology and
25. For details, see: Adrian Buzo, The Guerilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea
(Boulder: Westview, 1999), in particular chapters 1–3.
26. For example: Dae Sook Suh, based on Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, eds., Totali-
tarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, 2nd edn (New York: Praeger, 1965) and Leonard Schapiro,
Totalitarianism (New York: Praeger, 1972), characterizes the North Korean regime as totalitarian.
Dae Sook Suh, “New Political Leadership,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The North Korean System in the
Post-Cold War Era (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 81.
27. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, op. cit.
28. Houchang E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998).
29. Hyon-Jun Chun, Bukhan chejeui jongchijok tuksonggwa byonhwa jonmang [Political Charac-
teristics of the North Korean System and Prospects for Change] (Seoul: Korean Institute for National
Unification, 2000).
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the highest government official ever to defect to South Korea, asserted that the
North Korean leadership during the 1974–1994 period was Kim–Kim joint rule.30
The most important aspect of Kim Jong-il’s leadership structure was the
increased status of the National Defense Commission and the institutionalized
participation of active military officers in politics. Kim Jong-il abolished the office
of the President of the Republic, and designated the office of the Chairman of the
National Defense Commission (himself) as the highest office, designated the
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly to
perform administrative and ceremonial functions formerly performed by the head
of the state. Under Kim Jong-il, professional military officers on active duty were
allowed to dominate the government.31 Songun chongchi (Military-First Politics),
according to Kim Jong-il, was the most effective way to defend and protect “the
North Korean style socialism (urisik sahoe chuui).” It was also believed to be the
surest way to achieve a strong and “affluent nation (kangsong taeguk).”
Kim Jong-il allocated a lot of resources and prestige to the military to guarantee
its loyalty to him. The military economy, deputed to feed and equip national troops,
had greater priority over national resources than the civilian economy.32 In 2009,
the North Korean regime implemented a monetary reform ordering the exchange
of old currency for new currency at a rate of 100 to 1. This caused the collapse of
buying power for ordinary citizens, but it was decided that government workers,
including especially military personnel, should be paid at pre-currency reform
levels, even increasing their purchasing power. Therefore, even when economic
reforms ended in complete failure, military members still benefited.33
The system of comprehensive and constant surveillance of the military, which
had been well established during the Kim Il-song era, was still in place. As a result,
Kim Jong-il was in solid control of the military.34 The affirmation of the Songun
philosophy, which was not altered even during the period of food shortages and
famine in the country, made the Korean People’s Army responsible for internal
security as well as defense of the nation. A disproportionate amount of the annual
budget was reserved for the military.
Kim Jong-il used several ideological and institutional mechanisms to prevent
and preempt potential elite splits. First of all, in the revised Constitution of 1998,
30. Joongang Ilbo, 14 September 1999.
31. Dae Sook Suh, op. cit., pp. 73–78.
32. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, North Korea Through the Looking Glass (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 115.
33. Sang Hun Choe, “Economic Measures by North Korea Prompt New Hardships and Unrest,”
New York Times (3 February 2010), at <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/04/world/asia/04korea
.html?_r=1> (searched date: 15 April 2012).
34. Seong Chang Cheong, “Bukhanui byonhwa yoin, yuhyonggwa jonmang [Factors, Types, and
Prospects of Changes in North Korean Political System],” in Taek Young Hahm, ed., Kim Jong Il
chejeui yongnyanggwa saengjon jollyak [Capabilities and Survival Strategies of the Kim Jong-il
Regime] (Seoul: IFES, 2000), pp.193–236.
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which was also called the Kim Il-song Constitution,35 Kim Il-song was character-
ized and presented as the founding father and the permanent president of the
nation. He was an immortal leader who would stay with North Korean people
forever. In contrast to the overshadowing legacy of Kim Il-song, Kim Jong-il’s role
seemed rather limited: he was basically in charge of military affairs. By pursuing
rule by Kim Il-song’s legacy (yuhun tongchi) and staying under Kim Il-song’s
shadow, Kim Jong-il was able to take advantage of the fertile and rich wellspring
of legitimacy bequeathed by Kim Il-song and could unite the elite as a whole. In
other words, Kim Jong-il enhanced his political legitimacy and ensured elite unity
through preserving and retaining Kim Il-song’s legacies and memories.
Moreover, Kim Jong-il also adroitly modified the contents of Juche ideology,
which had been one of the two main pillars of North Korean society36 and the
most powerful ideological tool to control and manage North Koreans. Resisting or
failing to practice Juche was a cardinal crime in North Korea. Earlier during its
formative years, Juche emphasized political independence (chaju), economic self-
reliance (charip), and military self-defense (chawi). Under Kim Jong-il, however,
Juche was more about “protecting the Supreme Leader to death (suryong kyolsa
ongwi chongsin).”37 Thus modified, Juche freed Kim Jong-il from potential criti-
cisms of policy errors (in foreign relations, economic and military affairs) and
required absolute loyalty to himself. Such reinterpretation of Juche effectively
muted any dissent within the ruling elite.
Overall, the North Korean regime under Kim Jong-il remained totalitarian. As
was true with a few historical cases of totalitarianism, the North Korean elite did
not have any cleavage. The North Korean elite shared a common value system and
Weltanschauung, with unity and cohesiveness stronger than in other countries.
Rather than taking different approaches on policy issues and thus risking being at
variance with Kim Jong-il and his Juche ideology, North Korean elites strived to
reach a consensus, to maintain a sense of community, and to hold on to their
collective interests and prerogatives.38
In 2008, Kim Jong-il failed to appear at major events: this fostered the specu-
lation of a serious illness, probably a stroke, that had affected the Dear Leader.
Immediately, many started talking about the possible collapse of the North Korean
regime and began analyzing the possible future scenarios. In April 2009, Kim
Jong-il reappeared in public, but it became evident that something was indeed
happening in the framework of succession to the Dear Leader: the National
Defense Commission was expanded to include new representation from a variety
35. For the full text, see Bukhan yonguso [Center for North Korean Studies], ed., Bukhan Daesajon
[A Big Dictionary of North Korea] (Seoul: Bukhan Yonguso, 1999).
36. Helen-Louise Hunter, Kim Il-song’s North Korea (Westport: Praeger, 1999).
37. Seong Chang Cheong, op. cit.
38. Taek Young Hahm and Chong Kim, “Kim Jong Il chejeha bukhanui jangnae [Future of North
Korea under Kim Jong-il],” in Taek Young Hahm, ed., Kim Jong Il chejeui yongnyanggwa saengjon
chollyak [Capabilities and Survival Strategies of the Kim Jong-il Regime] (Seoul: IFES, 2000), p. 18.
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of public security agencies. But more importantly, there were many signs that the
official successor had already been designated in the person of Kim Jong-il’s third
son, Jong-un. This hereditary succession surely contributed to making of North
Korea a unique example from a political point of view – a formal “communist”
regime in which the power was transmitted in a direct way – but it was also the
most expected eventuality because direct transmission of power could in a sense
protect the integrity of the regime leaving untouched all the elites’ privileges.
Kim Jong-un officially became the new leader after his father’s death in Decem-
ber 2011. It seems clear now that Kim Jong-un is distancing himself from his late
father, choosing a different approach and a different ideological paradigm. And,
looking at the Arab experience, the economic situation of the country could be a
dangerous symptom for the new leader. The difficult economic conditions in North
Korea have been further exacerbated by the suspension of help from the other
states following the military incidents of 2010 – the sinking of the South Korean
corvette Chonan and the shelling on the South Korean island of Yonpyong. The
population of the country is highly impoverished after bad economic reforms and
has many troubles in dealing with ordinary life. The consciousness that people in
bordering countries, even in China, have much better and easier lives could create
a dangerous feeling of disenchantment among North Koreans. For Kim Jong-un, it
is risky to continue his father’s military-first policy.
At the same time, however, Kim Jong-un’s power is highly dependent on the
military’s support, and any attempt to “marginalize” the military will be fero-
ciously resisted. The importance of the military for regime stability was clearly
evidenced by the appointment of Kim Jong-un as four-star general in the Korea
People’s Army, his nomination as vice chairman of the Party’s Central Military
Commission, and as a member of the Party’s Central Committee. In addition, it
seems that he was credited in the domestic media for the Chonan sinking and the
attack on Yonpyong Island.
It is perhaps too early to conclusively characterize Kim Jong-un’s leadership and
the elite structure under him. As was demonstrated by Ri Yong-ho’s purge in July
2012, it seems reasonably clear that in contrast to the Kim Jong-il era, the military
elite will not dominate the key decision-making process. At the same time,
however, Jang Song-taek’s sudden execution in December 2013 indicates that
Kim’s leadership will not rely heavily on technocrats. There will be some adjust-
ment of power distribution between the military and economic reform technocrats.
In the end, due to Kim Jong-un’s reliance on the military, the power adjustment
will not be so radical that it threatens the military’s interest or/and jeopardizes
regime stability.39
39. SeungYolYi, “Kim Jong Un chejeui byonhwawa jonmang: elite jongchaek sontaegul jungsimuro
[Changes in and Prospects of the Kim Jong Un Regime: Elite’s Policy Choices],” Bukhan Gyongje
Review [The North Korean Economy Review], ed. KDI (Korea Development Institute) (October
2012).
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In summary, under Kim Jong-un, it is rather infeasible that an elite split between
“hardliners” (for example, the military) and “softliners” (for example, economic
reform technocrats) emerges and evolves seriously. Economic reform technocrats
will likely be able to generate and exert greater policy influence as compared with
the preceding Kim Jong-il period. However, they will be significantly checked and
balanced by the military elite on which Kim Jong-un relies heavily for his legiti-
macy and authority. There will be no serious split between different types of the
elite. Kim Jong-un will be able to manage the intra-elite tension by supporting and
privileging the military elite whenever conflict becomes too menacing.
Civil Society
Discussing “civil society” in North Korea is particularly frustrating. According
to the existing literature on democratic transition and consolidation, civil society is:
A set of self-organized groups and movements in society that are relatively autonomous from the
state, basic units of production and reproduction, and political society, and are capable of political
activities in the public sphere to express their concerns and advance their interests according to
the principles of pluralism and self-governance.40
In this way, civil society plays crucial roles in facilitating authoritarian breakdown,
democratic transition, and democratic consolidation.41
As is manifest from its definition, a pivotal characteristic of “civil society” is its
“autonomy” from the state.42 In this regard, it is highly questionable whether
historically any political and social groups and organizations in North Korea have
ever commanded any, however limited and imperfect, independence of the state.
As mentioned above, that many North Korean experts still, quite fittingly, classify
North Korea as a “totalitarian” regime unequivocally illustrates that the autono-
mous “intermediate space” or the “public sphere” is seriously wanting in North
Korea.
There exist about 100 “mass groups” in North Korea today. Some groups, such
as the Korean Vocational Federation (Choson chigop chongdongmaeng), the
Federation of Agricultural Workers (Nongop kulloja tongmaeng), the Korean
Literature and Arts Federation (Choson munhak yesul chongdongmaeng), and the
Journalists’ Federation (Kija tongmaeng), are based on social strata and vocational
categories. Other groups, including the Korean Federation of Socialist Labor
Youth (Choson sahoejuui nodong chongnyon tongmaeng), the Korean Democratic
Women’s Federation (Choson minju yosong tongmaeng), and the Youth Federation
40. Sunhyuk Kim, op. cit.
41. Ibid.
42. Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of
Democracy, 5-3 (July 1994), pp. 4–17; Philippe C. Schmitter, “Civil Society East and West,” in Larry
Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, eds., Consolidating the Third Wave
Democracies: Themes and Perspectives (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
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(Sonyondan), are based on either gender or age groups.43 However, all these social
groups without exception perform such roles as “extensively educating and indoc-
trinating the public,” “serving as the transmission belt connecting the mass and the
party,” and “working as the faithful assistant of the party.”44
There are several different methods of social control in North Korea, which all
place severe constraints on social groups and their activities. The most important
and effective tool of social control, what a CIA report has summarized as one of
the two “pillars” of North Korean society,45 is songbun (political classification
system). Songbun is an elaborate system of citizen profiling, according to individ-
uals’ family background, ideological orientations, and, above all, loyalty to the
North Korean regime and leadership. What significantly augments and enhances
the system of songbun is yongoje (family purge). Under this system, individuals
are punished not only for their wrongdoings but also for those of their direct and
extended family members, relatives, friends, and colleagues. All North Koreans are
expected to inform on one another, even children on their parents. If they do not
report a crime and it is disclosed, they are implicated. Yongoje has proved
extremely effective “in deterring all but the most brave, selfish, or reckless indi-
viduals from going against the Kim regime.”46
Underpinning these elaborate systems of political classification and family
purge is the ubiquity of government intelligence agencies. Examples include the
Ministry of People’s Security (MPS, Sahoe anjonbu), the State Security Depart-
ment (SSD, Kukka anjon powibu), the Military Security Command (MSC, Powi
saryongbu), the Committee in Charge of Socialist Legal Practice (Sahoejuui
pommu saenghwal chido wiwonhoe), and People’s Watch (Inminban). Of these
agencies, the MPS and the SSD are most powerful and significant.
The MPS is in charge of overseeing and monitoring citizens, investigating and
profiling citizens’ backgrounds, approving changes in residence or job, and author-
izing domestic travels. It is also responsible for overseeing a national police force
responsible for maintaining law and order, investigating common criminal cases,
and conducting preliminary examinations.47 In essence, the MPS’s function is a
combination of policing, public safety, intelligence and counterintelligence. If the
MPS detects a dissident or disloyalty case, it hands the case over to the SSD, which
is comparable to the Soviet KGB. The department has several charges: searching
for anti-state criminals, conducting domestic and foreign operations of intelligence
and counterintelligence, operating political prison camps, and keeping tabs on
43. Seong Bong Yi, “Bukhanui gyongje gaehyok gaebanggwa jongchi chejeui byonhwa [Economic
Reform and Opening in North Korea and Political Changes],” Pyonghwa Yongu [Peace Studies], 9
(2000), p. 66.
44. Ibid., p. 65.
45. Helen-Louise Hunter, op. cit., p. 3. The other pillar, as mentioned above, is Juche ideology.
46. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, op. cit., pp. 138–139.
47. James M. Minnich, “National Security,” in Robert L. Worden, ed., North Korea: A Country Study
(Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Law Books and Publishing Division, 2009), p. 276.
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North Korean personnel abroad.48 These security organizations permeate every
sector of society and monitor the private and public life of North Korean
citizens and also foreign visitors. The security establishment remains intrinsically
untouched after the power transition to Kim Jong-il and later to Kim Jong-un,
although the new leaders have tried to install their own security aides, in an attempt
to strengthen their personal authority and the party’s leadership role as well as
to rebalance the power relationship between key players and the main security
institutions.49
Meanwhile, constant political education, socialization, and lifetime indoctrina-
tion also profoundly affect North Koreans’ psyches, attitudes, and behaviors.
Brainwashing comprises endless political study sessions and criticisms and self-
criticisms. It also includes re-education of diplomats, workers abroad, and workers
in South Korea’s joint venture companies.50 The pervasive presence of the party
into every organized social interaction is finalized both to exert capillary control
and to obstruct the development of revolutionary political activities.
Equally inimical to the possible burgeoning of civil society in North Korea is
tight information control by the government. No foreign newspapers, radio or TV
broadcasts are allowed. Lack of alternative sources of information prevents people
from judging the validity of the Kim regime’s constant negative propaganda about
the outside world. Even with respect to very limited information that manages to
seep into the country, the North Korean leadership makes clear that such “imperi-
alistic pollution” is designed by North Korea’s enemies to undermine socialist
beliefs and those who share it with others will be severely punished.51 Under this
tight information control, North Koreans have only two kinds of comparisons
available: between the North Korea now and the North Korea in the past and
between North Korea and the other “corrupt,” “egocentric” capitalist countries. In
addition, it must be noted how the North Korean regime, in order to prevent any
kind of internal revolution, has carefully avoided – or highly limited – the rise of
groups whose presence could be detrimental to the regime: intellectuals, students,
and clergymen.
The emergence and evolution of civil society are to a great extent dependent on
the level of socioeconomic development. Lack of any substantial socioeconomic
development significantly hampers the emergence and evolution of civil society in
North Korea. Due to its concerns about unintended, largely deleterious, conse-
quences of economic reform, such as “ideological contamination,” North Korean
leadership has been reluctant about economic opening and reform. As a result, the
“reform” in North Korea since the 1980s has oscillated between practical efforts to
48. Ibid., p. 278.
49. Alexandre Mansourov, “Overhauling the Legacy Government,” 38 North (21 December 2012),
at <http://38north.org/2012/12/amansourov122112/> (searched date: 5 January 2013).
50. Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, op. cit., pp. 140–142.
51. Ibid., pp. 142–143.
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earn badly needed foreign currency via limited economic opening and strong
emphasis on self-reliance and anti-imperialism.52
When Kim Jong-il died, he left a country in a moribund economic state, as a
result of his Songun policy that fed an ambitious missile and nuclear program at the
expense of a malnourished population. Some observers predict that Kim Jong-un,
the Swiss-educated heir, could start a series of economic reforms. There have
indeed been official statements and personnel changes in support of economic
development. It seems plausible that the intent to rebuild the economy, as a future
policy objective, is a consequence of the uncooperative relations with Seoul and
frictions with the United States. This situation, in fact, leaves the North to rely
solely on China for its economic push. However, even if this process of economic
reform finds any implementation, it seems highly unlikely that in the near future it
could change the scenario so dramatically that the general population would be
relieved from the condition of acknowledged poverty.
It has been widely assumed that the main vehicle for the ignition and diffusion
of the Arab Spring uprisings in the Middle East was the Internet, and in particular
widespread social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. In Egypt and
Tunisia, both characterized by relatively young and tech-savvy populations, the
Internet – according to many – has played a decisive role, even “producing” the fall
of regimes thought to have control of the web. Technologies, active even before the
revolutions, have helped people interested in democracy build extensive networks,
create social capital, and organize political action. Internet use in both countries is
significant, stimulated ironically by the government’s traditional censorship and
harsh control on the media, and mobile phone use is widespread. Soon after
Bouazizi’s desperate act, activists have constantly covered the events by spreading
accounts and videos on the web. Social media were highly effective not only in
shaping political debates and spreading democratic ideas in the countries involved
in the protests, but also in channeling discontent toward the regimes and organizing
the tactics of protest.
In North Korea, the fruition of the Internet is extremely limited: “normal”
citizens do not have any access to the web, even though Kwangmyong – a sort of
intranet that ties together different institutions (libraries and universities, for
example) but that does not allow any possibility of “external projection” – was
introduced at the beginning of the century. Some North Koreans have unfiltered
access to the Internet, but this seems to be available only to a very selected elite.
The Star Joint Venture Co. – a joint venture between the North Korean gover-
nment’s Post and Telecommunications Corporation and Thailand-based Loxley
Pacific – provides Internet connection in the country. Before the implementation of
52. Hyong Jung Pak, “Bubun gaehyok chegyeui chulbom, nanpawa bokku: 1980 nyondae
jungbanbuto 2000 nyondae choggajiui bukhan gyongje [The Launching, Dismantlement, and Res-
toration of Partial Reform Regimes: The North Korean Economy from mid-1980s to early 2000s],”
Bukhanhak Yongu [North Korean Studies], 3 (2002), pp. 109–137.
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the Star Joint Venture Co., connections were possible via a cross-border hook-up
to China Netcom or via satellite to Germany.53
Whereas the Internet is heavily guarded, the technology infrastructure is much
more porous for mobile phones. The relative diffusion of mobile devices started
around the beginning of the century, but in May 2004 cell phones were banned
across the country, possibly because of the uncontrollable expansion of pre-paid
devices along the Chinese borders.54 The ban was lifted in mid-2008, when
Orascom Telecommunications, a part of an Egyptian conglomerate, penned a
$US400m deal with North Korea to provide 3G service covering a huge part of the
country. In the last few years, the number of mobile users in North Korea has
boomed, reaching possibly 2,000,000 in May 2013.55 The government is extremely
attentive and suspicious of these devices: they cannot access the Internet and can
only make calls within the country, since international calls are blocked. For a short
time, foreigners in the country were able to use mobile Internet, but this access was
later revoked. It is believed, however, that many in North Korea, particular those
near the borders, use illegally owned mobiles to contact people outside the country;
the possession of illegal devices remains a very major crime.
Overall, it is quite unlikely that North Korea’s change can be ignited or helped
by the widespread use of technology, as in the case of Tunisia and Egypt. Given the
absence of a civil society or political opposition, it is unlikely that some sort of
social unrest will originate from the use of the Internet or cell phones. It should also
be noted that the capillarity of controls exerted by security institutions is strength-
ened by mutual controls among citizens and even by self-control derived from the
extreme pervasiveness of the North Korean regime. Therefore, the risk is that
instead of being detrimental to the stability of the regime, cell phones could
provide a pretext to strengthening and expanding social control and surveillance in
the country.
In summary, civil society in North Korea is dismal. The North Korean society,
tightly controlled and monitored by state security institutions, has neither the
capacity nor the intention to rebel against the authoritarian regime. Mechanisms
and devices of social and ideological control are ubiquitous. The lack of socioeco-
nomic development and the continuation of the dire economic situation seriously
53. Martyn Williams, “North Korea Moves Quietly Onto the Internet,” Computerworld (10 June
2010), at <http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177968/North_Korea_moves_quietly_onto
_the_Internet?taxonomyId=18&pageNumber=2> (searched date: 18 March 2013).
54. Peter Nesbitt, “North Koreans Have Cell Phones: Why Cell Phones Won’t Lead to Revolution
and How They Strengthen the Regime,” Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, 22 (Special Edition:
Emerging Voices on Korea: New Trends in North Korea) (2011).
55. This figure is highly disputed; nonetheless, it refers to the number of subscribers to the 3G
service, Koryolink, that was launched in December 2008 by CHEO Technology JV Company, a joint
venture between the Egyptian telecommunications firm Orascom and the North Korean Korea Post
and Telecommunications Corporation. See Yonho Kim, “A Closer Look at the ‘Explosion of Cell
Phone Subscribers’ in North Korea,” 38 North (26 November 2013), at http://38north.org/2013/11/
ykim112613/ (searched date: 1 December 2013).
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militate against the emergence and evolution of civil society in North Korea. The
Internet and mobile phones do not seem to have great potential in effecting a
significant change in North Korea either. All in all, civil society, which played
crucial roles in many countries democratized earlier in the 1970s and 1980s, does
not seem to exist in any meaningful fashion in North Korea today and, if it does
exist, it does not seem to promise any significant role in promoting democratic
transition there in the near future.
Conclusion
The prospect of democratic change in North Korea is rather bleak at the
moment. None of the three factors that arguably facilitate and promote democratic
transition – that is, elite split, civil society, or international pressure – exist in North
Korea. In this sense, non-transition in North Korea is “overdetermined.”
Two of the three factors favorable to democratic development, that is, civil
society and international pressure, interact closely with each other and with the
contextual condition of socioeconomic development. According to Lipset’s classic
“optimistic equation,” socioeconomic development brings about various changes
in class structure and promotes the emergence and development of civil society.56
Socioeconomic development is also frequently propelled by deeper incorporation
into the global market system and adoption of an export-oriented industrialization
strategy. Meanwhile, the growth and empowerment of civil society heavily relies
on the greater opening of the economy and free exchanges of information with
outside world. Also, activities and campaigns of international human rights organi-
zations and financial institutions become more effective and powerful in synergy
with a vibrant domestic civil society. Moreover, these three factors are also fairly
long-term ones: None of these three factors could be obtained in a short period of
time. It takes a long time to achieve socioeconomic development, to generate and
empower civil society, and to activate and augment international pressure.
Therefore, the only factor that is relatively variable in the short run is elite split.
For the time being, Kim Jong-un is likely to pursue a cautious and limited indus-
trialization strategy, carefully maintaining and managing the balance between
generals and technocrats. If reform is successfully pursued, it will effectively keep
the military silent and as the most loyal and crucial power base for Kim. If reform
does not go well and negatively affects the interests of the military, however, the
military might be prompted to dissent. Meanwhile, technocrats, however small in
number, might demand more fundamental reconsideration of the existing devel-
opment strategy. In either scenario, it is not entirely unimaginable that the elite
unity as it stands today might undergo some form of transformation.
56. Seymour M. Lipset, op. cit. For a criticism of Lipset’s “Optimistic Equation,” see Guillermo
O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics
(Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979).
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The real dilemma in crafting a viable North Korea policy is that the factor with
the greatest likelihood, that is, elite split, is also the factor with the least control-
lability. Neither the United States nor South Korea is able to penetrate North Korea
to influence elite strategies and interactions. Therefore, US and South Korean
governments have no option but to focus on enhancing the other, more long-term
conditions.
Particularly worrisome in this context is the gradually but significantly aggra-
vated relationship between South Korea and North Korea during Lee Myung-bak’s
government. It is not unreasonable to suspect that another version of the collapse-
of-North-Korea theory was behind the hardline stance of the Lee administration on
North Korea. The Lee government seemed more interested in a post-North Korea
policy, not a North Korea policy.
If the new South Korean government under Park Geun-hye is operating under
a similar assumption of an impending North Korean collapse, either natural or
induced, this will only lead to undesirable policy consequences. The prediction
of the collapse of North Korea is unfounded and erroneous. North Korea has
impressively weathered all those years of “multiple economic stresses” well and
does not show any sign of regime breakdown. North Korea will not collapse, and
it is therefore a serious policy error to operate under the misleading assumption
that the collapse of North Korea is forthcoming. Also, after all, the North’s
sudden collapse is not desirable for South Korea – it will be a catastrophic
disaster.
Rather than crafting a North Korea policy under the wishful, if not delusional,
thinking of the collapse of North Korea, therefore, both South Korea and the
United States should accept the enduring existence of North Korea as a given
and then proceed to determine the best ways to facilitate political change in
North Korea. The most prudent course of action is to continue and deepen the
policy of engagement. Only engagement and incremental incorporation of the
North Korean economy into the global economy can provide the best chance of
socioeconomic development in the country, which can promote the growth of
civil society and can generate elite split as economic reform deepens. Also, only
engagement can increase North Korea’s dependency on and thus vulnerability to
various international political and economic pressures. Engagement, pursuing
(Willy) Brandtian (or Egon Bahrian) “Change through Rapprochement (Wandel
durch Annäherung),” is the best way to possibly bring about change in North
Korea. Mobilizing all diplomatic resources to engage North Korea and to induce
it to open and reform its economy is the best method of increasing the chance of
political change in the longest totalitarian regime in modern history.
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